Jaume Masip
Department of Social Psychology and Anthropology

Overlooking the obvious: Incentives to lie may be a powerful deception cue

Bond, C. F., Jr., Howard, A. R., Hutchison, J., & Masip, J. (2013). Overlooking the obvious: Incentives to lie. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 35, 212-221.

Over the years, people have searched for deception cues in the liar’s behavior. However, the sender’s incentives to lie might be more revealing than behavior. In Experiment 1, an incentive was developed that was predictive of lying. Judges with access to incentive information in addition to behavior achieved almost perfect lie/truth detection. This was not a result of the speakers’ behavior being transparent (Experiment 2) but because incentive information was useful to separate lies from truths (Experiments 2 and 3). Experiment 3 revealed that people may forego perfectly diagnostic contextual cues to base their judgments on illusory behavioral cues.

Comments are closed.
Política de privacidad