

The Populist Radical Right and European Integration: A Comparative Analysis of Party-Voters Links.

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Abstract

This article analyses the links in eleven European countries between populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration. It does so by using data from the 2008 European Social Survey and the 2006 UNC-Chapel Hill Expert Data Base on political parties and European integration. In addition to mapping the Eurosceptic orientations of political parties and their voters, this article examines the degree to which attitudes towards the EU and voting for populist radical parties are connected to each other. Our results lend support to the hypothesis that most populist radical right parties have managed to establish links with their voters regarding European integration. Our analysis shows also that links between populist radical right parties and their voters tend to be stronger for those parties that adopt more extreme negative positions towards European integration.

Several comparative analyses have shown the important role that populist radical parties play in the politicization of orientations towards the EU. Populist radical right parties have adopted the most Eurosceptic positions since the 1990's (Marks, Hooghe and Wilson 2002), they have contributed to connecting nationalist fears and exclusive identities to negative orientations towards the EU (De Vries and Edwards 2009), and they have provided their voters with the strongest cues regarding the EU (Steenbergen, De Vries and Edwards 2007). Recent comparative analyses of the structure of political conflicts in Europe have also shown that populist radical right parties can play a crucial role activating a new dimension of political contestation pitting proponents and detractors of globalization against each other (Kriesi et al. 2008).

Yet despite the evidence about the role that populist radical right parties play politicizing European integration issues, we still do not have comparative empirical analyses on the role that European integration plays in the links between populist radical parties and their voters. In this article we seek to fill this gap and develop a comparative analysis of the links between these parties and their voters in eleven European countries. We analyze here the degree to which populist radical right parties and their voters have established discernible programmatic links regarding European integration, a development that may be crucial for the redefinition of political conflicts and interparty competition in Europe. Ultimately, this comparative examination of populist radical right parties can shed light on the opportunities and constraints that they face in order to

redefine their political agendas and increase their electoral support. Our analysis uses data from the 2008 European Social Survey (ESS-4 2008)¹ and from the 2006 UNC-Chapel Hill Expert Data Base on political parties and European integration (CHES),² and includes all countries covered by the 2008 round of the ESS for which a relevant party has been characterized as belonging to the radical right party family in the UNC-Chapel Hill database, that is France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Finland, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and Slovakia. The parties labeled as radical right in the UNC-Chapel Hill Expert data base are the Flemish Vlaams Belang (VB), the French Front National (FN), the Danish Dansk Folkparti (DF), the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), the Greek Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos (LAOS), the Finnish Perussuomalaiset (TF), the Polish Prawi Spravedodivosc (PiS), the Romanian Partidul Romania Mare (PRM), the Slovak Slovenská Národná Strada (SNS), the Latvian TB-Trvzemeiun Brivibai (LNNK) and the Bulgarian Nacionalno Obedinenie Ataka (NOA). In addition to being right in the general left-right dimension and tan in the new politics, gal-tan dimension (questions 10 and 12 in the UNC-Chapel Hill data base), all of these parties advocate extreme nationalist positions (a value of 8 or higher in question 31, on a scale that ranks from 0 to 10). With only one exception (the Polish PiS), all of these parties favor extremely tough anti-immigration policies (a value of 8 or higher in question 25 on a scale that ranks from 0 to 10). And with the exceptions of True Finns and TB-LNNK, these parties support adopting very tough measures to fight

crime (a value of 8 or higher in question 19 on a scale ranking from 0 to 10). Consequently, with the partial exceptions of the PiS, True Finns and TB-LNNK, these right-wing and tan parties tend to adopt extreme positions on three dimensions that are critical for the identification of populist radical right parties: cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism, liberal vs. restrictive immigration policies, and civic liberties vs. law and order.

We are aware of the ideological and political heterogeneity of this group of parties. They arose in very different political and historical contexts, adopted initially different ideological mixes, and established links with different socioeconomic constituencies in their respective party systems. In particular, parties faced entirely different contexts depending on whether they arose in post-communist or western European countries. This crucial difference accounts for the fact that most of the populist radical right parties in post-communist countries seem to present very different characteristics from the ideal type of the populist radical right party. That is clearly the case of the PiS, which adopts very moderate anti-immigration positions, can be also considered a Catholic conservative party, and belongs to the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists in the EU Parliament, along with the British Conservative Party. Caveats could be raised for the Latvian TB-LNNK (Mudde 2007: 53), also a member of the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists, a residual or borderline case now merged in the National Alliance with an ultranationalist extreme

right party (the Alliance for Latvia), and also for the Romanian PRM, quite volatile ideologically, except for its ultranationalist and anti-Hungarian character. However, also Western European populist radical right parties present important idiosyncrasies, as it is clear in the cases of VB, which as the Italian Lega Nord also resembles peripheral nationalist parties, or the PVV, which does not share the morally traditionalist character of other populist radical right parties and could also be labeled as a neoliberal nationalist and populist party. In fact, the PiS and the PVV are the only two parties addressed in this analysis that were not included in the list of populist radical parties proposed by Mudde (2007).

In the face of this diversity, we could either try to maximize the homogeneity of the parties included in the analysis, thus ending with a very small group of cases, or adopt more lax criteria in order to capture the patterns of variation that characterize parties that, to use the fuzzy-sets terminology, are either “fully in” or “more in than out” in the set of populist radical right parties. In our view, given the strong tendency of this type of parties to present distinctive idiosyncrasies in the ideological elements that surround their nationalist and nativist core, it makes more sense to adopt the second, less restrictive research strategy. The grounds for this choice are reinforced by the fact that expanding the number of cases will precisely allow us to identify patterns of variation among this type of parties in their linkages with their voters regarding the EU. In this respect, we do not we expect any significant drawback from this research

strategy which, if anything, could provide us with additional evidence regarding those cases whose membership in the populist radical right family is debatable .

We are also well aware that we do not include other important populist radical right parties, like the Austrian FPÖ and BZÖ, and the Italian Lega Nord, although the membership of the latter in the populist radical right family is also disputed (Mudde 2007: 56). This is due to the fact that neither Austria nor Italy was part of the 2008 round of the ESS. We also exclude from our analysis other populist radical right parties for which the number of respondents in the country surveys was far too low, as it is the case of the French MPF.

Next section presents the main debates on the issue of European integration and party competition, and the question of congruence of opinion between parties and voters, in particular for the party family of the populist radical right. Strikingly, while most studies on the populist radical party have neglected the issue of European integration, research on Euroscepticism has highlighted the utmost importance and distinctiveness of the populist radical right in its opposition towards European integration among all party families. The second section maps comparatively the absolute and relative position of populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration across European party systems. And the third section provides two types of multivariate analysis of the links between populist radical right parties and voters. We examine, first, using OLS regression, whether voting for populist radical

right parties is a statistically significant predictor of Eurosceptic attitudes. And second, we apply logistic regression to examine whether Euroscepticism is a statistically significant predictor of voting for populist radical right parties. Both types of techniques reveal the presence of some links between populist radical right parties and their voters regarding the EU for most of the included cases. The evidence collected here and summarized with three empirical indicators shows not only the presence of links on European integration, but also the strength of these links. Our exploratory analyses show also that variations in the strength of these links may be related to the degree to which populist radical right parties have adopted extreme positions regarding European integration. We conclude by drawing some the implications of the presence of these links for our understanding of the role of populist radical right parties in the politicization of European integration and the transformation of European party systems.

1. European integration and the study of the Radical Right.

Over the past two decades an increasing number of academic studies have analyzed the populist radical right party family (Hainsworth 1992, 2007; Betz 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Ignazi 2004; Carter 2005; Taggart 2005; Norris 2005; Mudde 2007). There are still different views on the most appropriate label for these parties (extreme right, populist radical right, radical right),³ on their characteristics (nationalist, nativist, xenophobic, authoritarian, etc), and on membership in this family. This is not surprising

given the heterogeneity parties in this family exhibit in terms of their origins, ideology, social basis, and electoral performance (Hainsworth 1992, 2007; Kitschelt 1995; Norris 2005; Carter 2005).⁴

Despite their different characteristics, a common baseline can be established along the lines of nationalism, xenophobia and exclusive identity politics. There is almost a consensus on the literature on the fact that nationalism (Hainsworth, 2007) or nativism, to distinguish their type of nationalism from other kinds of nationalism, act as the core ideological element for these parties, even if some other ideological features, like their populism and authoritarianism (Mudde 2007), are also present among them.⁵ Their extreme nationalism is directly connected to their xenophobia, their anti-immigration attitudes, and their welfare chauvinism (Mudde 2000). As several authors have pointed out (Mudde 2010; Sniderman et al 2000), these orientations are also related to the mainstream values and orientations of contemporary European societies.

Opposition to European integration has been considered, most of the times, as a very secondary issue in the characterization of the politics of this party family. We think this is remarkable given the strong connection that exists in the literature between exclusive national identities, the defence of national sovereignty and orientations towards European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Furthermore, the prevalence of their nationalist orientations over other sorts of ideological attachments allows these parties to avoid facing ideological tensions when defining their position towards

European integration⁶. However, with the exception of Mudde's book on the populist radical right in Europe (Mudde 2007), Euroscepticism is hardly mentioned to characterize the politics of the populist radical right party family.

The absence of the issue of European integration in the studies of the populist radical right is most striking since the literature on European integration has shown the distinctiveness of the Eurosceptic position of the populist radical right. Already the first study that examined party families and their attitudes towards the European Union highlighted the anti-European attitudes of the radical right party family (Hix and Lord 1997:42). Moreover, since the early 1980s the Euroscepticism of the populist radical right has been clearly growing. Today the populist radical right is the most Eurosceptical party family and some scholars claim that "radical right parties are without exception, highly Eurosceptical" (Hooghe et al. 2004:133; Steenbergen 2004).

The concept of Euroscepticism refers broadly to negative attitudes to the European integration process. Different typologies have been proposed to characterize Eurosceptic parties. Perhaps the most frequently used distinction is that between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism coined by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002). 'Hard' Euroscepticism is defined as 'principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived' (Taggart and Szczerbiak

2008:7), whereas soft Euroscepticism does not include principled opposition to the EU, but ‘concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas’ leading to ‘qualified opposition to the EU’ (Taggart and Szczesbiak 2008:7). At the public-opinion level, recent contributions have highlighted the multidimensional character of attitudes towards the EU, revealing the different components and determinants of affective orientations, identities, utilitarian and performance-based judgments, and views on decision-making strengthening (Boomgarden et al 2011).

Research on party based Euroscepticism has considerably increased over the past decade giving rise to what Mudde defines as the Sussex and North Carolina’s schools’ (Mudde 2011). These schools differ in definition, data, scope and findings on party positions on European integration. Sussex’s definition builds on the above qualitative and dichotomous distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism. By contrast, North Carolina’s definition focuses on the ‘overall orientation of party leadership’ towards European integration in a continuum ranging from extreme opposition (1) to total support for integration (7) (Ray 1999). Based on this scale, it is possible to establish different criteria (substantive, absolute, and/or relative) and thresholds to distinguish Eurosceptic and non Eurosceptic parties (Mudde 2011: 11-12). Different examples of cutting points would be the neutral point in the scale (4), the expression of timid support for European integration (5) (Mudde 2011: 12), or a specific distance between the party position and the average or weighted average party

system position (De Vries and Edwards 2009:11). Overall, however, as Mudde (2011: 11) points out, definitional debates have been less important in the works developed by the North Carolina school, which has been more focused on providing explanatory answers to empirical puzzles than on developing a precise and unambiguous concept of Euroscepticism.⁷ There are also important methodological differences between both schools. Whereas the Sussex's approach is based on the official positions of political parties, North Carolina studies are based on surveys conducted among country experts. Both types of approaches present advantages and limitations, and both can be combined to elaborate comprehensive and in-depth analyses of party positions towards European integration (see Mudde 2011: 19). However, the fact that the UNC-Chapel Hill surveys include the same questions for all European countries and at different points in time makes them particularly useful for the development of systematic comparative analyses on the characteristics, correlates, and evolution of Euroscepticism among political parties. It is for this reason that analyses in this article are to a large extent based on data provided by the UNC-Chapel Hill expert survey.

Another crucial debate regarding Euroscepticism tackles the issue of whether ideology or strategy accounts for party positioning on European integration (Mudde 2011). Some authors conceive of Euroscepticism as a strategy often employed by political parties on the fringes of the party system (Taggart 1998), while others maintain that Eurosceptic party positions are rooted in ideology – left/right or 'new politics'

(Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks and Wilson 2000). As for the populist radical right, it has both ideological and strategic reasons to adopt Eurosceptic platforms. Ideologically, the populist radical right rejection of European integration is grounded on its defense of national sovereignty and its opposition to the erosion of strong (and exclusive) national identities (Marks et al. 2002; Hooghe et al. 2004; Edwards and De Vries 2009). Strategically, populist radical right parties can aim at improving electoral results by presenting themselves as the only defenders of national sovereignty and culture, both of which are threatened by the process of European integration (De Vries and Edwards 2009). For this group of parties, ideological and strategic considerations can be treated as mutually enforcing rather than alternative or mutually exclusive (Kopecky and Mudde 2002; De Vries and Edwards 2009).

The comparative study of Eurosceptic parties based on in-depth analysis of the cases conducted by Taggart and Szczerbiak, classified the Euroscepticism of eight of the eleven populist radical right parties examined in this article. The VB, FN, and SNS were labeled as ‘hard’ Eurosceptic, whereas the DF, TF, PiS and PRM were labeled as ‘soft’ Eurosceptic (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008:11-12). Table 1 lists the populist radical right parties we analyze, their position on European integration according to country experts, and, if available, their classification as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Eurosceptic parties according to Taggart and Szczerbiak’s classification.⁸ Both qualitative labels and spatial positions reveal the presence of different levels of Eurosceptic orientations

within this party family. Table 1 reveals also the presence of important differences between the information provided by quantitative and qualitative indicators (most notably in the cases of SNS and TF).

---Table 1 about here---

Thus, our starting point is an overall Eurosceptic party family due to both ideological and strategic considerations, but with some evidence on internal differences in their degree of Euroscepticism. To the extent that opposing European integration is both coherent with the general ideological outlook of these parties and electorally profitable, there are good reasons to expect party-voter congruence and party-voter links within this party family regarding the EU.

Certainly, some studies have underscored the limited importance of European issues for voting decisions in Europe (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). However, more recent analyses have revealed that the electoral role of European integration varies significantly across countries, and that these variations depend on factors like the salience of the EU among national publics, the existence of party divisions on this issue, the connection of attitudes towards the EU to the left-right dimension (De Vries 2007), and the diffusion of Euroscepticism among the national publics (Kriesi 2007). The saliency of European integration cannot be taken for granted for Eurosceptic and/or populist radical right parties either (Steenbergen and Scott 2004: 177; Green Pedersen 2012). However, analyses of public attitudes towards the EU have shown that populist

radical right parties tend to provide their voters with the strongest cues regarding this issue (Steenbergen, De Vries, and Edwards 2007)⁹. And the fact that Eurosceptic attitudes are quite consistent with the nationalist ideological core of these parties can make it easier for these parties to seek to develop links with their voters based on their Eurosceptic orientations. In fact, some studies have already shown that European integration does play a role in the explanation of voting for populist radical right parties in France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Lachat: 2008), which is consistent with the growing politicization of European integration posited by Kriesi et al (2008) and Hooghe and Marks (2008).

In sum, studies on Euroscepticism have highlighted the comparative distinctiveness of the populist radical right party family regarding European integration in several respects: programmatic positions, strategic importance, and party-voter cues. However, there are no comparative studies specifically examining the role that European integration plays in the relationships between populist radical right parties and their voters. Consequently, we also lack empirical comparative evidence on the role that European integration plays in voting for populist radical right parties, and on the degree to which party-voter links regarding European integration are shared by all parties ascribed to this party family. The fact that neither party-voter congruence nor party-voter links on European integration can be taken for granted for the members of this party family makes it even more important to develop comparative studies on the

strength of the connections between this type of parties and their voters regarding this specific dimension.

Ultimately, the study of the role of European integration for the populist radical right is also connected to our understanding of the current transformations of European party systems. Kriesi et al. (2008: 11) have shown the importance of a new socio-political cleavage pitting those favouring globalization to those resisting it. In this new conflict, the populist radical right tends to adopt radically anti-integration or pro-demarcation positions in the political-cultural field (Lachat and Kriesi 2008: 281-82), which entails opposing European integration and adopting restrictive positions with regard to immigration (Kriesi et al. 2006:13). In this respect, Euroscepticism is ‘part and parcel of the new structural conflict over integration’ (Lachat and Kriesi 2008:290), a conflict in which populist radical right parties play a key role shaping and channelling anti-integration demands in the political arena. For this reason, the importance of analyzing party-voter links between populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration goes beyond the interest of refining our knowledge on the specific properties of populist radical right parties and their voters.

2. The absolute and relative positions of populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration

Do populist radical right parties and voters show similar levels of Euroscepticism? And how homogenous are the positions of parties and voters in comparative perspective? A first step to approach the study of the positions of populist radical right parties and their voters towards European integration consists in using uniform benchmarks based on the absolute, substantive content of the two variables informing us of the positions of populist radical right parties and their voters.¹⁰ For this purpose, we take the intermediate points in both variables (that is, 4 for the party positions, and 5 for the citizens' orientations) as the frontier separating negative and positive views of the EU. First of all, parties tend to be more Eurosceptic than their voters. All parties adopt stronger positions on European integration than their voters and the populist radical right family is no exception (Mattila and Raunio 2006:427). In absolute terms, we find that in five out of eleven cases both populist radical right parties and their voters adopt Eurosceptic positions (see Graph 1).¹¹ This is the situation for the VB, LAOS, DF, FN and TF.¹² We also find that eight out of eleven parties adopt Eurosceptic positions.

As for the specific combinations of party and voter positions, these data show that four parties adopt Eurosceptic positions but have pro EU voters (one from Western Europe, PVV, and the rest from the East, NOA, SNS, and PiS), one party displays a pro-EU position but has Eurosceptic voters (TB-LNNK), and, finally, one party adopts a pro-EU position and has pro-EU voters (PRM). That is, consistently with what has been underlined by the literature on Euroscepticism, all but two populist radical right parties

adopt substantively Eurosceptic orientations. However, there are five instances in which the positions of populist radical right voters are not substantively Eurosceptic.

---Graph 1 about here---

If we compare the positions of populist radical right parties and their voters (see Graph 1) we find a positive association between these two variables. More pro EU parties tend to have the more pro EU voters, and clearly Eurosceptic parties (FN, TF) receive the votes of (comparatively) Eurosceptic citizens. However, there are some exceptions to this pattern, like the NOA, the PVV and, most clearly, the TB-LNNK.¹³

Now, a comparative analysis strictly based on the absolute positions of populist radical right parties and voters on these scales does not clarify the nature of the links between parties and voters regarding European integration. The orientations of national parties and publics are different, and what appears to be a moderate position within the party family might be in fact far from the prevailing consensus within a national party system. And vice versa, an anti-EU position on these scales might be shared by other voters and/or parties at the national level. Therefore, only by taking into account the characteristics of national public opinions and party systems can we assess the nature and direction of the links.

A first way to assess the relative positions of populist radical right parties and their voters consists in comparing their orientations towards the EU with those of other

parties and their voters in their respective party systems. Graph 2 shows the distances between the positions of populist radical right parties and their respective party system averages (weighted by the last results in national elections) (horizontal dimension) and the distances between the positions of populist radical right voters and the national average position (vertical dimension). This graph shows that, for all the countries included in this analysis, populist radical right parties are more Eurosceptic than the average position of national political parties. It is also clear that parties tend to be placed farther from the national average than voters do (particularly if we take into consideration that the range of the scale is larger for political parties than for the national publics). And there are even some cases in which party voters are not more Eurosceptic than their respective national averages (PVV and TB-LNNK) or just marginally so (PRM). Overall, there is a moderate tendency for parties that are distant from the national party system average to receive the votes of comparatively Eurosceptic citizens as well.

---Graph 2 about here---

Graphs 3-13 show the position on European integration of both parties and voters (ESS averages) in each national party system. These graphs reveal that most populist radical right parties adopt comparatively Eurosceptic positions, though not necessarily *the most* Eurosceptic ones in their respective party systems. However, in more than half of the cases (Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and

Romania), populist radical right parties are indeed the most Eurosceptic national political forces. There is a less marked tendency for populist radical right voters to adopt the most Eurosceptic orientations within their respective party systems (in five out of eleven cases), and there are even two cases (the Netherlands and Latvia) in which the voters of populist radical right voters are not more Eurosceptic than the national average.

These graphs also show that there are different patterns of association between the positions of parties and voters in each of these countries. Only in the party systems of Denmark, Greece, France and Finland, there are clear and symmetric associations between party positions and voters' preferences on Euroscepticism.

---Graphs 3-13 about here---

Table 2 classifies the cases depending on whether populist radical right parties and/or voters are the most Eurosceptic ones in their respective party systems. There are four cases (VB, FN, SNS and TF) in which both parties and voters rank amongst the most Eurosceptic ones, which suggests the presence of party-voter links based on the extreme Eurosceptic orientations of both parties and voters (in relative terms in their respective party systems). This group is in clear contrast with the cases of PiS, TB-LNNK, and LAOS, in which neither parties nor voters rank amongst the most Eurosceptic. These two contrasting scenarios are the more favorable and unfavorable,

respectively, for the populist radical right issue ownership of Euroscepticism. Finally, in eight out of eleven cases either populist radical right parties or their voters adopt the most Eurosceptic positions in their respective party systems.

---Table 2 about here---

Overall, and despite the presence of important national differences, it is clear that the populist radical right party family leans towards Eurosceptic positions. We have established that all populist radical right parties but two (the Romanian PRM and the Latvian TB-LNNK) have clear Eurosceptic orientations, and that the voters of six out of eleven parties have also substantively Eurosceptic orientations. Thus, in five out of our eleven cases, **both** parties and their voters adopt Eurosceptic orientations (VB, TF, FN, DF, and LAOS). Furthermore, all populist radical right parties are more Eurosceptic than the weighted national party system average, and all populist radical right party voters but two hold more Eurosceptic orientations than their respective national averages. Ultimately our analysis has also shown that either populist radical right parties or their voters adopt the most Eurosceptic positions in their respective party systems, with exception of the cases of PiS, LAOS and TB-LNNK.

3. Multivariate national analysis of the links between populist radical right parties and their voters.

So far we have examined the links among populist radical right parties and their voters by considering cross-national variations in the average positions of populist radical right parties, their voters and the national publics. However, we have not established the degree to which there are specific associations between the EU orientations of populist radical right parties and voters after controlling for other correlates of both European attitudes and voting for populist radical right parties. If populist radical right voters were more Eurosceptic than other voters, after controlling for other correlates of European orientations (like social class, education, ideology, etc), then we could infer the existence of links between populist radical right parties and their voters in the specific domain of European integration. This association would be established irrespective of whether the source of this connection lies in the ability of populist radical right parties to cue their voters into Eurosceptic orientations (elite cueing) or in the fact that, by adopting Eurosceptic positions, populist radical right parties manage to attract the support of already Eurosceptic voters.¹⁴

We have used two complementary technical procedures to examine the links between populist radical right parties and their voters in each of the countries considered. In the first place, we have examined, using OLS regression, whether voting for populist radical right parties is a statistically significant predictor of Eurosceptic

attitudes after controlling for several sociodemographic and attitudinal variables. And in the second place, we have examined, by applying logistic regression, whether Euroscepticism is a statistically significant predictor of voting for populist radical right parties after controlling for other variables plausibly connected to populist radical right voting. For both types of analysis we have used data from the 2008 round of the European Social Survey (ESS4-2008).¹⁵ We consider these analyses as complementary rather than reiterative, since the dependent and independent variables used in the models predicting populist radical right voting and Eurosceptic attitudes are not identical. Both analyses provide information on the links between parties and voters but in different ways. The first one shows to what extent voting for the populist radical right is associated with the position on European integration, and the second analyses the influence of Eurosceptic attitudes on populist radical right voting. Our expectations regarding our control variables in both types of models are not symmetric: for instance, we expect the probabilities of voting for populist radical right parties to increase as we move from left to right in the classical left-right dimension, but we do not expect increasingly Eurosceptic orientations as we move from left to right in that same dimension.

For our OLS regression analysis on the determinants of Eurosceptic orientations, we have taken as our dependent variable responses to question B 34 of the ESS survey.¹⁶ In order to measure the association between populist radical right voting and

European attitudes we have created a dummy variable for voting for populist radical right parties. In this variable, respondents who vote for populist radical right parties received a value of 1, whereas the rest of respondents in the survey receive a value of 0. Since we expect voters for populist radical right parties to display negative orientations towards European unification, the B coefficient for this variable should be negative. In addition to this variable, we have included several other statistical controls plausibly affecting European attitudes. Thus, we have included dummies for income (both for high and low income levels)¹⁷, education (both for respondents with university education and with primary education or less)¹⁸, gender, age, membership of trade unions,¹⁹ left--right ideology²⁰, left-right ideological radicalism²¹, religiosity degree²² and, finally, a variable mapping attitudes towards immigrants.²³

For our second analysis, we have run a logistic analysis in which our dichotomous variable for voting for populist radical right parties was our dependent variable. The objective of this analysis was to ascertain whether attitudes towards the EU help to predict voting for these parties after introducing all the previously mentioned controls in our regression model, with the only exception of the left-right ideological radicalism, due to the fact that we do not expect support for populist radical right parties to increase as the ideological orientations of voters move towards extreme left.

Table 3 displays the coefficients for voting for populist radical right parties in the models predicting Euroscepticism, whereas Table 4 shows the coefficients for

European attitudes in the logistic regression predicting voting for populist radical right parties. B coefficients point always in the expected direction: the voters of populist radical right parties tend to be more Eurosceptic than other voters (in the OLS models), and Euroscepticism favors voting for populist radical right parties. However, the B coefficients are not significant at the .10 level (neither in the OLS and logistic models) in three countries, Romania, Latvia, and Greece.

----Tables 3 and 4 about here----

Consequently, our statistical analysis reveals the presence of statistically discernible links between populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration in eight out of our eleven cases after controlling for several explanatory variables plausibly connected to both European attitudes and populist radical right voting. For these eight cases, our results are consistent with our expectation that European attitudes are one of the issues connecting populist radical right parties and their voters. Still, the low number of populist radical right voters in some of the cases analyzed here (in particular France and the Netherlands) makes our results tentative, and poses some limits to the external validity of this finding.

As for the three cases in which no such links are discernible, they are less surprising for the Romanian PRM and Latvian TB-LNNK than in the case of the Greek

LAOS. The PRM and the TB-LNNK are the only two parties that are not substantively Eurosceptic, and whose voters are not the most Eurosceptic ones in their national electorates. In contrast, in the case of the Greek LAOS, both the party and its voters are substantively Eurosceptic. It is possible, however, that the even more markedly Eurosceptic character of the Greek Communist Party prevents party-voter links regarding the EU from becoming discernible by this statistical analysis.²⁴

By examining the connections of parties and voters within their respective party systems, and by moving therefore beyond the comparative examination of the absolute positions of parties in the European integration dimension, we have been able to identify the presence of programmatic connections between populist radical right parties and their voters in a consistent Eurosceptic direction, notwithstanding the important differences that distinguish these parties from each other. Moreover, it is also revealing that these associations hold in models that control for cultural attitudes towards immigrants, a variable that has been shown to be a key determinant for the electoral support of populist radical right parties (Norris 2005), as well as an important component of the new integration-demarcation dimension (Kriesi et al. 2008), a dimension that populist radical right parties try to activate in the electoral arenas contributing to the emergence of triangular-shaped party systems (Meguid 2005; Kriesi et al. 2006). In fact, in the survey data we are analyzing, attitudes towards immigrants

are also associated with the European orientations of respondents, as shown by the Pearson correlation indexes reported in Table 5.

---Table 5 about here---

We have created a table that summarizes the three characteristics directly connected to the presence of party-voter links regarding European integration: the combined substantive absolute positions of populist radical right parties and their voters, their combined relative positions, and the presence of statistically significant links between populist radical right voting and European attitudes in our multivariate analyses. Based on the absence-presence of these three characteristics, Table 6 presents a summary index of the strength of party-voter links regarding European integration within this party family.

---Table 6 about here---

Table 6 shows that, with the exception of the TB-LNNK and the PRM, all parties exhibit some kind of connection between the positions of parties and their voters regarding European integration. And in eight out of eleven cases, our multivariate analysis has identified the presence of statistically discernible links between voting for populist radical right parties and attitudes towards the EU after controlling for other

variables. Our summary index shows that the politicization of European integration for populist radical right parties and their voters varies within the party family but it is particularly strong in three cases (France, Finland and Belgium) in which all the characteristics included in our summary are present. The FN and VB are two old and prototypical populist radical right parties. They are characterized by their extreme nationalist, xenophobic and anti-immigrant positions, and they both were classified as ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties in Taggart and Szczerbiak’s volume. By contrast, the recently renamed Finns (True Finns) belongs to the latest generation of populist radical right parties. Finnish politics were characterized by the absence of hard Eurosceptic parties (Raunio 2008) until the breakthrough of the TF in the European elections of 2009 and the national elections of 2011. In fact, this success has been attributed to the anti-EU discourse in a context of increasing politicization of European integration (Raunio 2012; Arter 2010:485).

At the other extreme, two parties (PRM and TB-LNNK) do not display any kind of linkages with their voters regarding European integration. In addition to being located in two post-communist party systems, both these parties are characterized by their clearly pro-EU stances (the most pro-EU in this sample, see Graph 1). It is also characteristic of these parties that their voters display orientations towards the EU which are almost equal to the respective national averages (see Graph 2). The very strongly pro-EU attitudes of the Romanian population in that period (an average of 7.5 in our

ESS indicator of Europeism) can help explain the pro-EU positions adopted by the PRM and its lack of links with its voters on this dimension (although also the Bulgarian public opinion was strongly pro-EU). However, national attitudes do not explain the position and links of the TB-LNNK, given the timid support of the Latvian population for European integration (an average of 4.6 in the same indicator). Only an in-depth study of Latvian politics could throw light on the determinants of the stances and links with its voters of the TB-LNNK.

In the intermediate positions in this table we find very diverse combinations of characteristics. The otherwise very different SNS and DF exhibit the same aggregate score, but display a different combination of values. The DF and its voters are substantively Eurosceptic, but not “the most Eurosceptic,” due to the strongly anti-EU position of the radical left Socialist People’s party (EL) in Denmark. By contrast, despite the hardening of its EU position (Henderson 2001, 2008), the SNS and its voters are Eurosceptic only in relative terms (they are the most Eurosceptic in the Slovakian party system). In fact, in none of these post-communist countries can we find an instance in which both the party and the voters adopt absolute Eurosceptic positions.

As for the group of parties displaying just one type of link (NOA, PiS, PVV, LAOS), they present an even more diverse combination of features. The fact that the PVV only displays significant links in the multivariate analysis can be connected to its very recent emergence. The PVV was created in 2006 as a splinter party of the

Conservatives in the Netherlands (Krouwel 2008). Some of its features led to question its nature as a clear populist party such as the precedent List Pim Fortuyn (Vossen 2010). The party became well-known for its anti-migrant stance and had its first breakthrough in the 2009 European elections. The 2009 European Elections Study shows that the voters of the PVV have experienced, with those of the PRM, the sharpest decline in their pro-EU orientations: if we had used the 2009 European Election Study, the PVV would have also met the second column criterion. The LAOS shows a strong anti-European position in absolute terms but its Euroscepticism is overshadowed by the harder Euroscepticism of the post-Comunist KKE. As for the NOA and PiS, they only show party-voter links in the multivariate analysis. Their voters are not Eurosceptic in absolute terms, and there are more extreme Eurosceptic parties and/or voters in their respective part systems.

It would require an in-depth comparative analysis to identify all the social and political factors impinging on the nature and strength of party-voter links regarding European integration, something that goes beyond the objectives of this article. Both empirical analyses and theoretical explorations have led to the conclusion that supply-side factors are critical to the electoral success of populist radical right parties. We also assume, based on previous analyses, that supply-side factors (located at the party- and party-system levels) are critical for the development of links between these parties and their voters regarding specific political issues (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen, Edwards and de

Vries, 2007). Certainly, the core ideological and programmatic characteristics of these parties must also play a role in the definition of party positions and in the development of party-voter links regarding this issue. However, nationalism is not a sufficient condition for the development of strong links between populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration. Almost all of these parties are strongly nationalist and nativist, and however, they do show very different degrees of connection with their voters on this issue.²⁵ We assume by contrast that the specific positions these parties adopt on the issue of European integration must exert a more direct influence on the development of such links. In particular, we hypothesize that the more extreme the Eurosceptic positions adopted by populist radical right parties (absolute as well as relative), the more likely the development of strong party-voter links in this issue will be. One reason for this is that adopting extreme positions makes it easier for small parties to achieve policy differentiation and increase their electoral share (Wagner 2012). Certainly, adopting extreme positions is connected to other characteristics and strategic choices of political parties identified as critical by the literature on party-voter links (Ray, 2003; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries, 2007), such as party dissent (a precondition of extreme party positions) and saliency, which, to a large extent, can be considered a consequence of positional choices (Wagner 2012: 66). Adopting extreme positions must also be linked to the general characteristics of national public opinions,

in particular, to the strength of Eurosceptic orientations, which necessarily impinge on the strategic choices of populist radical right parties and their competitors.

Our exploratory analyses show that the more extreme the Eurosceptic positions of populist radical right parties,²⁶ the higher the number of links identified in our summary index and the stronger the B coefficients for party-voter links in our OLS analysis (see Graphs 14 and 15).²⁷ However, not all parties fit well in this pattern. For instance, in Graph 14, one would expect the PVV and the VB to display higher and lower numbers of party-voter links respectively. The PVV fits much better in the general pattern shown by Graph 15, but, in this case the coefficient for the DF and PiS are larger than expected. These discrepancies show that a fully satisfactory explanation of the strength of party-voter links would demand an in-depth comparative analysis of determinants of positional choices and of the interactions between by these and other supply- and demand-side level factors, such as party dissent, EU saliency,²⁸ the strategies adopted by other political parties and the attitudes of the national publics towards the EU. This task remains beyond the scope of this research.

---Graphs 14 and 15 about here---

Conclusion

This article sought to examine the presence of links between populist radical parties and voters on the issue of European integration. Our findings endorse the hypothesis that populist radical right parties establish links with their voters regarding the European integration process. In particular, the fact that our multivariate analyses detect the presence of such links even after controlling for other variables related to voting for populist radical right parties indicates that, for most of the parties family, European integration has become one of the issues around which they structure their relationship with their voters. This is consistent with previous evidence on the distinctiveness of European integration for party voting. Thus populist radical right parties have achieved distinctiveness on the issue of European integration and managed to connect Eurosceptic attitudes to other core elements of their ideological discourse, such as their anti-immigration views and, at a more general level, their nationalist positions.²⁹

Kriesi et al. (2008) have underscored the opposition of the populist radical right to key social and political-cultural components of globalization, in particular, to immigration and supranational integration. Lachat's analysis (2008) showed that attitudes towards the EU contribute to explain voting for the parties of the populist right in France (FN), Switzerland (SVP) and the Netherlands (LPF). Our analysis reveals the importance of links on the EU between populist radical right parties and their voters for a more recent period and for a larger number of cases. Furthermore, such links can be found in some post-communist Eastern European countries, which underscores the

presence of some similarities between Eastern and Western cases. However, there is no instance in Eastern Europe in which both populist radical right parties and their voters are substantively Eurosceptic. And although some links between parties and voters are present in three Eastern European cases (SNS, NOA, PiS), in two of them they are limited to the existence of statistically significant coefficients in our multivariate analysis. This indicates that party-voter links regarding the EU do exist in the East, but tend to be weaker than in Western Europe, which might be a result of the more recent integration of these countries into the EU, the different attitudes and interests of Eastern European public opinions regarding European integration, and the lower degree of programmatic structuration of post-communist party systems (Marks et al. 2006).

These differences notwithstanding, our comparative analysis shows the presence of party-voter links for parties of different character within the populist radical right party family, and in quite diverse social and political-institutional settings. As we previously mentioned, this finding endorses arguments by other authors on the importance of conflicts around the main components of globalization, in particular on European integration, for the transformation of interparty competition in Europe (Kriesi et al. 2008; Hooghe and Marks 2008).

Our findings also suggest new questions and avenues for research. Methodologically, they call for both expanding the number of populist radical right parties covered in the analysis and for in-depth comparative studies with a small number

of cases, addressing variations over time in the political activation of European integration (Green Pedersen 2009). And substantively, they call for the analysis of the different social and political factors, at both the supply- and demand-level, shaping the links between populist radical right parties and their voters regarding European integration. Our exploration is consistent with the hypothesis that the positions adopted by populist radical right parties are critical to the links they establish with their voters regarding the EU, more extreme parties tending to display stronger links with their voters in this issue. But we will need more in-depth comparative analyses in order to understand the influence that this and other types of factors (issue salience first of them) exert on the structuring of links between populist radical right parties and their voters. Assessing the impact of these and other different explanatory factors will demand developing a different research design and gathering new data. This must remain the objective of future research and analysis.

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
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
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Graphs and Tables

Graph 1: Populist radical right parties and voters. Absolute positions on EI




Graph 2. Distances between populist radical right parties and the weighted party system average (horizontal dimension) and between populist radical right voters and public national averages (vertical dimension).




Graphs 3-11. Party positions and voters' preferences regarding European integration.


Graph 3: Bulgaria




Graph 4: Belgium




Graph 5: Denmark




Graph 6: Greece




Graph 7: France




Graph 8: Netherlands




Graph 9: Finland




Graph 10: Latvia




Graph 11: Poland




Graph 12: Slovakia



Graph 13. Romania



Graph 14. Party positions (2006 UNC-Chapel Hill data base) and party values in our summary indicator for party-voter links.



Graph 15. Party positions and B coefficients for the effects of populist radical right voting on European attitudes in the OLS analysis.




Table 1: Populist Radical Right parties and the EU

Party	Party Ab.	Country	EU Position CHES 2006	Taggart's classification
Dansk Folkparti (Danish People's Party)	DF	Denmark	2.33	Soft
Front National (National Front)	FN	France	1	Hard
Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos (Popular Orthodox Rally)	LAOS	Greece	2.38	-
Nacionalno Obedinenie Ataka(National Union Attack)	NOA	Bulgary	2.46	-
Partidul Romania Mare (Party of Great Romania)	PRM	Romania	4.20	Soft
Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom)	PVV	Netherlands	1.55	-
Perussuomalaiset (True Finns)	TF	Finland	1.64	Soft
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Justice Party)	PiS	Poland	3.50	Soft
Slovenská národná Strana (Slovak National Party)	SNS	Slovakia	3.23	Hard
Trvzemeiun Brivibai (For Fatherland and Freedom)	TB-LNNK	Latvia	4.75	Hard
Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest)	VB	Belgium	2.50	Hard

Table 2. The relative Eurosceptic orientations of populist radical right parties and their voters (in bold letters the cases in which both parties and party voters are also Eurosceptic in absolute terms).

	Most Eurosceptic Voters	Not Most Eurosceptic Voters
Most Anti-EU party	VB, FN, TF, SNS	NOA, PRM, PVV
Not Most Anti-EU party	DF	LAOS, PiS, TB-LNNK

Table 3. OLS Multiple Regression. Coefficients for the effects of voting for populist radical right parties on attitudes towards European integration (standard errors in parentheses).¹

	FN	DF	PVV	VB	LAOS	TF	LNNK	NOA	PRM	PiS	SNS
B	-1.15*** (.46)	-1.50*** (.26)	-1.35*** (.39)	-.63** (.30)	-.73 (.55)	-.86*** (.31)	-.29 (.33)	-.96*** (.30)	-.15 (.24)	-1*** (.20)	-.46* (.28)
Adj. R ²	.12	.14	.08	.09	.10	.12	.06	.10	-.08	.07	.06
N	1151	1168	1239	711	717	1304	642	762	720	727	894

*Significant at the .10

**Significant at the .05

***Significant at the .01

¹ More complete information about the statistical results for these models can be reported on demand.

Table 4. Logistic regression. Exp(B) coefficients for the effects of European attitudes on voting for populist radical right parties (standard errors in parentheses).

	FN	DF	PVV	VB	LAOS	TF	LNNK	NOA	PRM	PiS	SNS
Exp(B)	-.24*** (.09)	-.25*** (.05)	-.27*** (.09)	-.12** (.05)	-.09 (.08)	-.22*** (.08)	-.06 (.06)	-.16*** (.05)	-.04 (.05)	-.18*** (.04)	-.09* (.05)
Pseud.R ²	.18	.19	.22	.22	.22	.14	.09	.08	.05	.15	.04
N	1151	1168	1239	711	717	1304	642	762	720	727	894

*Significant at the .10

**Significant at the .05

***Significant at the .01

Table 5. Pearson correlation coefficients between attitudes towards immigration and European integration. ESS 2008. (All coefficients are significant at the .01 level).

FRA	DEN	NET	BEL	GRE	FIN	LAT	BUL	ROM	POL	SLVK
.31	.34	.15	.30	.21	.23	.23	.20	.16	.18	.21

Table 6. Summary of three indicators on party-voter links on EI.

	Eurosceptic Parties and Voters	Most Eurosceptic Party and Most Eurosceptic Voters	Statistically Significant Party-Voters Links	Summary Index of Party-Links regarding the EU
FN	1	1	1	3
TF	1	1	1	3
VB	1	1	1	3
SNS	0	1	1	2
DF	1	0	1	2
NOA	0	0	1	1
PVV	0	0	1	1
PiS	0	0	1	1
LAOS	1	0	0	1
TB-LNNK	0	0	0	0
PRM	0	0	0	0

Notes

¹ We have decided to use the ESS4-2008 instead of the 2009 European Parliament Election study because it was conducted closer in time to the 2006 UNC-Chapel Hill expert data base, and also because the ESS data includes higher numbers of populist radical right voters than the 2009 European Election Study (twice as many on average for the countries considered here). In some cases (such as the French FN) the number of voters in the 2009 European Election Study is particularly low (8 voters for the FN in the last general elections and 4 in the last European elections).

² Included are political parties that attained at least 2% of the vote in the election immediately prior to the survey year or that elect at least one representative to the national parliament (Hooghe et al 2010).

³ Many labels have been applied to this type of parties (new radical right, populist radical right, extreme right, etc.) (see for instance Kitschelt, 1995; Mudde, 2007; Hainsworth, 2007). Following Mudde (2007), in this article we opt for the populist radical right label. We prefer this denomination to that of extreme right because the latter has explicitly authoritarian overtones (Mudde, 2007: 23-31) and is often linked to the experience of fascist regimes and neofascist movements (Ignazi, 2004). We also prefer it to the quite extended new radical right label because this term denoted an economically neoliberal program (Kitschelt, 1995) that is not shared by most of these parties.

⁴ Due to the presence of important differences in the origins, ideological profiles and social bases, considerable attention has been dedicated to describe and explain the heterogeneity of this party family through the identification of different subtypes of populist radical right parties (Kitschelt, 1995; Carter, 2005).

⁵ See in particular Mudde (2007: 16 and the following) and Hainsworth (2007: 7). Several authors have also stressed the populist radical right rejection of key elements of liberal-democratic regimes and their anti-establishment populism (Hainsworth, 2007: 12; Carter, 2005: 17- 28; Mudde, 2000: 177; Ivaldi, 2004; Taggart, 1995).

⁶ On the effects of internal ideological tensions on electoral competition on specific issues, see Odmalm (2011).

⁷ On the trade-off between definitional precision and empirical problem-solving, see Popper (1974: 20-30).

⁸ Boomgarden et al (2011) have revealed the multidimensional character of attitudes towards the EU (see also Hobolt et al., 2011). Due to data limitations, we cannot map the positions of both parties and voters in each of these specific dimensions.

⁹ This result is not independent from the fact that public Eurosceptic positions are often underrepresented in national party systems, given the overall pro-EU stance of mainstream party families (Taggart, 2008).

¹⁰ In order to measure public attitudes towards the EU we have used question B 34 of the ESS survey, which is phrased as follows: “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?” Responses range from 0 (“Unification has gone too far”) to 10 (“Unification should go further”). We also use question 1 in the 2006 CHES questionnaire: ‘how would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2006?’, ranging from ‘strongly opposed’ (1), to ‘strongly’ in favour (7). As previously mentioned, we cannot locate the positions of citizens and parties in the different dimensions underlying European attitudes (Boomgaarden et al 2011). We assume, however, that our indicator for public opinion Euroscepticism is especially connected to attitudes towards the strengthening of the EU, the extension of decision-making competencies, policy transfer and further integration (Boomgaarden et al., 2011: 258).

¹¹ These averages are based on the respondents voting for each populist radical right party in the last national election (question B12). The number of voters for each party responding to this question on European integration (question B34) is as follows: DF (127), LAOS (46), LNNK (82), FN (29), NOA (88), PRM (142), PVV (35), VB (97), SNS (88), PiS (291), and TF (52). Unfortunately, the numbers of

respondents for some of these parties are very low. As previously mentioned, using the 2009 European Election Study would lead to a more dramatic limitation in the number of respondents. The average voting positions in the ESS4-2008 and 2009 European Election Study are however highly correlated for these eleven cases (Pearson correlation of $+0.88$). From 2008 to 2009 party voters have become more Eurosceptic in nine of the eleven cases considered here, the exceptions being the PiS and the SNS voters. The average position of party voters towards the EU (eleven cases) moved between these two surveys from 4.99 to 4.10.

¹² Among these, only the voters of TF, FN and DF adopt hard Eurosceptic positions (with around a 50% of their voters positioning themselves below point 3 in the 0 to 10 scale of Europeism we use in this paper). The percentage of PVV voters adopting strong Eurosceptic positions (3 or below) is also high (51%), but in this case the party does not adopt Eurosceptic positions.

¹³ The Pearson correlation index between these two variables equals $+0.53$. This index raises to $+0.73$ when the TB-LNNK is excluded from the analysis.

¹⁴ In this article we do not examine whether populist radical right parties cue their voters in the direction of Euroscepticism or whether they appeal to already Eurosceptic voters by adopting anti-EU positions. Assessing the strength of these two causal flows would demand a different kind of analysis.

¹⁵ With the only exception of Belgium, we have conducted these multivariate analysis at the national level. In Belgium, where ESS respondents are divided between Wallonia and Flanders, we conducted the analysis just for the voters in the Flanders region.

¹⁶ For the wording of this question and the scale used, see note 10. As we mentioned above, we assume that this question is particularly related to one specific dimension of European attitudes, the one that refers to the strengthening of the EU, the extension of decision-making competencies, policy transfer and further integration (Boomgarden et al., 2011: 258).

¹⁷ These dummy variables are based on responses to Question F-32 (HINCTNTA). Respondents in the lowest two income groups were labeled as low income, and assigned a value of 1 in the low income variable, whereas respondents in the two highest income groups were assigned a value of 1 in the high income variable. Due to the absence of data for Question F-32, these two dummy variables were not included in the OLS models for Bulgaria and Slovakia.

¹⁸ These variables are based on responses to question F6 (EDULVL).

¹⁹ This variable is based on responses to variable F30 (MBTRU). Respondents who belonged (currently or previously) to a trade union were assigned a value of 1. All other respondents were assigned a value of 0.

²⁰ Question B23, ranging from 0 –left- to 10 –right.

²¹ In order to assign values to this variable, individual self-placements in the left-right scale (question B23) were standardized (at the national level) and then squared.

²² Question C21, ranging from 0 –not at all religious- to 10 –very religious-. However, we could not find any indicator for religious intolerance, which has been shown to have a positive impact on Euroscepticism (Hobolt et al., 2011).

²³ In order to map orientations towards immigrants we have chosen variable B39 (IMUECLT), which reveals perceptions regarding the effects of immigration of national culture. Responses to this variable range from 0 (immigrants undermine the country's cultural life) to 10 (immigrants enrich the country's cultural life). Our selection of a variable focusing on the cultural implications of immigration is based on the importance that cultural demarcation has for both populist radical right parties and voters.

²⁴ Our results are consistent with Lachat's findings for the case of France, the only country in which his study covers a populist radical right party examined here. His study reaches similar conclusions in the Netherlands, but his work focuses on voting for the LPF instead of for the PVV. His results also reveal

the presence of statistically significant links between voting for populist radical right parties and European integration in the case of the Swiss SVP, but not in the case of the Austrian FPÖ.

²⁵In fact, for this group of parties there is no association between the level of nationalism and nativism, as measured by questions 31 and 25 in the UNC-Chapel Hill Expert Survey, and their links with their voters regarding European integration.

²⁶ For the sake of simplicity, and since absolute and relative party positions are strongly correlated (Pearson correlation of $-.85$ between the absolute populist radical right party positions and the distance between populist radical right party positions and the weighted average of the party-system positions), we will leave aside from this exploration the connections between these two indicators of party-voters links and the relative positions of populist radical right parties in their respective party systems.

²⁷ The Pearson correlation index between party positions and the summary for party-voter links equals $-.72$, and that between party positions and the B coefficients in the OLS analysis equals $+.74$. Certainly, the first two indicators on which we based our summary index already include information on party positions (whether parties are Eurosceptic and whether they are the most Eurosceptic ones), but they also take into consideration the absolute and relative positions of party voters. As for the B coefficients, they are not connected a priori with the positions adopted by parties regarding the EU.

²⁸ Party dissent and party saliency are already connected to party positions on European integration. The Pearson correlation between populist radical right party positions and party dissent equals $+.94$, and that between party positions and party salience equals $-.61$ (2006 UNC-Chapel Hill data base).

²⁹ In fact, the Pearson correlation indexes reported in Table 4 showed that anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes are positively related with each other among the populations of all the countries analyzed here.